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This paper examines the finances and the effect of credit limitations on the 
behavior and performance of firms in Costa Rica. The study is based on a survey 
of manufacturing firms conducted by the authors during 2001. The paper 
characterizes the profile firms’ finances, examines the determinants of firms’ 
access to banking credit and tries to assess the effect of credit constraints on the 
behavior and performance of firms.  
 
The paper finds that while banks are the main source of credit for larger 
firms, non-banking credit (trade plus informal credit) remains the leading source 
of funds for smaller firms. Moreover, own funds and informal credit is a leading 
form of credit for newly created firms.  It is also found that the probability of 
having banking credit and the fraction of banking credit/total debt is mostly 
affected by (if anything) characteristics of the firm and not by those of their 
owners. Indeed, the firm’s value and age, and whether it keeps formal accounting 
procedures appear as the most relevant determinants of access to banking credit. 
With respect to the starting up finances of firms, the data is not conclusive on the 
determinants of banking credit, yet it suggests a negative relationship with the 
previous entrepreneurship experience of the owner. The paper discusses different 
explanations, all of which highlight the importance of credit constraints.  
 
Adopting ideas from the econometric literature on treatment effects, the 
paper explores the effect of banking credit on the behavior and performance of 
firms. Two different methods are used to correct for selection biases: a parametric 
two-step point method and a non-parametric method that estimates upper and 
lower bounds for the effects. While the results are not statistically conclusive, 
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  3  41. Introduction 
 
Economists are familiar with the notion that credit constraints and other credit market 
imperfections may severely limit the investment and operations of firms. Credit constraints limit 
the size of firms, as well as their growth, profits, activations and liquidations; their scope of 
operations may also be limited. Understanding the implications of credit constraints is of first-
order importance for the performance of aggregate economies, especially for developing 
economies, as capital market imperfections can therefore impair the aggregate accumulation of 
capital, the rate of return of investments, innovations and accumulation. 
This paper investigates the existence, the determinants and the consequences of credit 
constraints for firms operating in Costa Rica. While the existence of credit market imperfections 
can be self-evident, this paper aims to empirically examine their nature and their relevance. The 
paper is based on a survey applied to a relatively large sample of manufacturing firms operating 
in the Metropolitan Area of Costa Rica.  Questions covered firms’ current finances as well as 
their sources of funds at the time they were established. On the basis of these data the paper 
explores the relationship between a firm’s finances and its characteristics and performance. 
The paper has three main objectives. The first is to analyze and compare the basic 
statistics on credit across firms with different characteristics, and the second is to identify the 
characteristics of firms and of entrepreneurs that determine whether they have access to credit 
from formal financial intermediaries. The third objective is to make progress on the difficult 
question of assessing the effect of access to formal credit on firms’ performance.   
A recent study by Monge, Cascante and Hall (2001) explored the institutional 
arrangements and banking practices present in Costa Rica for enforcing financial contracts. That 
study documented a rather sophisticated information network among lenders, finding that banks 
seem to actively screen and keep track of the projects they finance. Interestingly, banks use the 
value and liquidity of the collateral posted by the entrepreneur as a key criterion for granting 
credit. In fact, collateral plays a key role in the interaction between the creditor and the borrower, 
including cases of default and their resolution via civil courts. It was also found that previous 
experience with borrowers represents another major determinant of banks’ decisions to grant 
credit. In sum, the results reported in that paper suggest some of the main reasons why some 
entrepreneurs may not receive credit. 
  5Taking a different perspective, this paper examines information on firms instead of 
banks’ behavior. Complementing Monge, Cascante and Hall (2001), this paper examines 
differences in the sources of funds of firms with different characteristics. Among other things, 
this information can further an understanding the importance of internal versus external finance 
as well as the different sources of external finance, in particular, the importance of formal 
(banking) versus trade credit and informal credit for firms with different characteristics.  
Especially relevant is the question of what factors determine whether a firm has access to 
formal financial markets. It is well known that, typically, credit from formal institutions is less 
expensive than credit from informal creditors or commercial partners.   With these questions in 
mind, simple and standard econometric methods  (Probits and Tobits) are applied to the 
information that is gathered, with the goal of determining whether any of the characteristics of 
the firm and of the entrepreneur determine access to banking credit.
1 This question is examined 
not only in relation to firms’ current finances, but also for their reported finances at the time they 
started operating. 
The survey also asked firms to provide different measures of their performance. That 
information makes it possible to adopt econometric methods from the literature on treatment 
effects in order to assess the effect of access to bank financing on the performance and behavior 
of firms.  It is necessary, however, to address a key econometric problem: The characteristics of 
firms that determine their performance may also determine their access to credit from banks. It 
can be misleading to simply run an OLS including firms with access and without access and 
estimate the effect of banking credit from the difference in the average on performance measure.  
To correct for potential selection biases, two methods are used. The first is the widely used two-
step estimator developed mostly by Heckman (1974 and 1979). The method consists of first 
estimating the probability of access to credit and then using the predicted value to correct a 
regression on the performance of the firm. The second method is less well-known, but its 
application in economics and other social sciences is growing rapidly. This is a non-parametric 
method, which was mostly developed by Manski  (1995) and Manski and Horowitz (1995).   The 
method consists of estimating the worst-case and best-case scenario of the effect of access to 
banking credit on the performance of firms. The second estimator is more robust but typically 
                                                           
1 “Banking” credit also includes credit from savings and loans cooperatives and other quasi-banking financial 
intermediaries. 
  6less conclusive (less statistically efficient given correct functional form assumptions) than the 
parametric methods. With the data at hand, the results obtained seem to indicate that access to 
banking credit has indeed effects on firms’ behavior, and itt appears that the effect is stronger on 
young firms. 
It is important to highlight the limitations of this study. Unfortunately availability on data 
on firms is the major limitation in Costa Rica. That is precisely why the main task for this project 
consisted in collecting the data. However, only a cross-sectional data base can be recovered, with 
some retrospective questions on previous dates. The results hinge on the cross-section variation 
of active firms to identify the effect of credit constraints. The lack of panel data makes it 
impossible to apply GMM methods to test credit constraints on the investment of firms. Those 
methods have been discussed and applied with relative success by authors including Jaramillo, 
Schiantarelli and Weiss (1996) and Schiantarelli (1996).  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the economic models of 
credit constraints, and Section 3 reviews the banking credit and banking practices found in Costa 
Rica. The subsequent section provides the background information on the manufacturing sector 
in Costa Rica. Section 4 describes the survey that was conducted and the sample of firms, and 
Section 5 presents the methods used to single out the key determinants of access to formal credit. 
The sixth section discusses econometric strategies to isolate the effect of credit constraints on 
firm performance and present the results, and Section 7 concludes. The appendix contains tables 
and figures not included in the main text. 
 
2.  Credit Constraints and Firms’ Behavior 
 
Early theoretical models of entrepreneurship assume directly that credit contracts for business 
start-ups and ongoing financing are very limited. For example, in the model of Bernhardt and 
Lloyd-Ellis (2000), there are no credit possibilities at all. In their economy, the operation and 
formation of firms has to be funded by entrepreneurs’ accumulated savings and firms’ past 
profitability. In other models, the maximum credit agents can obtain to fund their productive 
ventures is modeled as a direct function of wealth or available collateral. Examples of those 
models are Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Hart and Moore (1994), and Banerjee and Newman 
(1991). Some of these models allow trade credit, i.e., funds that are backed by the goods 
supplied. 
  7More recent studies are much more explicit on the way credit markets work and on the 
role of private information, contract enforcement and renegotiation in shaping the form of 
contracts and access to lending. Moral hazard is the incentive problem that has received the most 
attention. If the bank takes too much of the project’s returns it might not be in the best interest of 
the borrower/entrepreneur to exert much effort or care. Rational lenders, though, would foresee 
the borrowers’ poor incentives and consequently restrict lending.  
In general, incentive problems can affect the operation of active firms and not only the 
establishment of firms. For example, some models predict that because of the incentive 
problems, firms with different net worth will choose different technologies. Agents who do 
manage to borrow, as compared with those relying exclusively on savings, may choose 
technologies or activities with lower variance but lower mean returns. For example, Monge 
(2001), Morduch (1995), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Lehnert, Ligon and Townsend (1999) all 
present variations on this argument. 
Another branch of the literature focuses on limited contract enforceability as the origin of 
credit constraints. Dynamic general equilibrium models with limited contract enforcement have 
been successfully applied for asset prices by Kehoe and Levine (1993), Alvarez and Jermann 
(2001), for consumption by Krueger and Perri (2001), international capital flows by Kehoe and 
Perri (2000), human capital accumulation by Lochner and Monge (2002), and firm and job 
creation and destruction by Monge (2001). In the context of firm financing, the models by Hart 
and Moore (1994), Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2001), and Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2001), 
the temptation to renege imposes limits on credit. Because the temptation to repudiate and 
default is a direct function of the net worth of the firm, those models provide explicit predictions 
on the links between firms’ age and size with their growth, survival and profits, as well as the 
dividends distributed to owners. 
Needless to say, these kinds of obstacles to the smooth operation of credit markets can 
make a difference in occupational choice, and therefore to small firms’ levels of activity, their 
success and their growth. The level of inequality, the overall rate of growth, and the level of 
employment are all functions of the nature of the credit markets. It easy to see that improvements 
in credit markets could have beneficial implications for growth, employment, and the distribution 
of income.
2  Furthermore, in a world where small firms are innovators, these limitations in the 
                                                           
2 See for example Banerjee and Newman (1991) and Lehnert (1998).   
  8allocation of credit could severely impair the ability of the whole economy to adopt new 
technologies and economic activities. 
All of the many different incentive problems emphasized by the theory may be of 
relevance in practice, and this agnostic attitude will guide the interpretation of the findings in this 
paper. 
 
3. Bank  Behavior  and  the  Allocation of Credit in Costa Rica 
 
Before reviewing the information on firms’ behavior, it is convenient to review the results in 
Monge, Cascante and Hall (2001), hereafter MCH, on bank practices in Costa Rica. That work 
studies the interaction of banks in all the stages of the lending relationship: analysis and approval 
criteria of loan applications, setting of contractual terms, control, follow-up and enforcement as 
well as renegotiation in cases of default. These findings are from the point of view of the banking 
institutions, and the information was obtained from a very detailed questionnaire submitted in 
1998 to a sample of intermediaries. 
MCH found significant differences in the default rates of financial intermediaries. On one 
hand, the production activities in Costa Rica are very heterogeneous and the financial 
alternatives are also very diverse, as there is a large variety of financial intermediaries.
3 
Traditionally, public institutions had dominated the allocation of credit as part of the politico-
economic model. But the waves of liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s and the structural 
changes in the economy have given much more room to private banks and intermediaries. 
Indeed, manufactures and services, the fastest-growing sectors, have relied more on private 
financing, while public banks remain more specialized in agricultural sectors.  
The equilibrium in the credit market equilibrium must determine which types of 
borrowers obtain credit from which type of lender.  Such matching can be vitiated by adverse 
selection, explaining part of the differences in the performance of banks. Yet, the ultimate 
determinant of the differences must be found in the credit policies of intermediaries. Table 13 in 
the Appendix shows the frequency of almost every conceivable control and screening action 
taken by banks. Any of these actions can in principle yield useful information about the 
prospects of the project, the characteristics of the borrower and the collateral.  The evidence 
  9contradicts the commonly held view of banks as dormant lenders. In fact, the banks in the sample 
are very active, and measures such as visits to the firm, analysis of the project and the incentives 
and capacity of repayment of their customers are not uncommon. Obviously, the high frequency 
of these actions may be due to the regulation of the Superintendency of Banks and the reserves 
that banks must hold for different risk qualification for loans. 
Banks pay particular attention to entrepeneurs’ collateral.  The overwhelming majority of 
banks make some assessment of the existence, type, market value and liquidity of collateral, and 
unsecured lending is almost non-existent. Moreover the reputation of the borrower is also a key 
element in evaluating an application. Monge, Cascante and Hall (2001) asked about the 
importance of a variety of criteria in deciding whether to grant the loan, and Table 14 of the 
Appendix reports the importance of those criteria. All elements related to the warranty put on the 
project and the solvency and references of the borrower play a critical role. 
Monge, Cascante and Hall also find that banks look for information on the entrepreneur 
from alternative sources. Indeed, the use of credit bureaus is widespread, as indicated by Table 
15 in the Appendix. In showing the proportion of banks that use credit bureaus, the table 
indicates that banks in the Metropolitan area have a greater need for those references, while 
banks in rural areas have more first-hand information on creditors.  The operational 
characteristics of these bureaus, some of which are shown in Table 16 of the Appendix, is a clear 
indication of the level of sophistication of the information network available to lenders. 
Undoubtedly, the findings of MCH support the relevance of a variety of incentive 
problems in the different stages of the bank-entrepreneur relationships. Banks devote resources 
to scrutinizing applications, controlling the development of ongoing projects and enforcing 
contracts, even at the level of the courts. This paper attempts to complete the picture by 
surveying a rather large set of firms and obtained information on their behavior and financing 
characteristics. It is first convenient, though, to provide some background on the manufacturing 
sector in Costa Rica. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3 Formal institutions are composed of three commercial public banks, twenty-three private banks, thirty-five savings 
and loan cooperatives, seventeen non-banking private financial companies, nine housing mutual funds and three 
other intermediaries created under special laws. 
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4.  The Manufacturing Sector in Costa Rica 
 
The manufacturing sector was selected for several reasons. First, as indicated above, the 
importance of this sector has remained stable and indeed has increased lately. Second, the 
available data is better for this sector than for agriculture, services and commerce.  Moreover, the 
sector is largely located in the Metropolitan Area, which made it possible to obtain a 
representative sample with the limited resources available. Finally, banking credit to 
manufacturing firms is dominated by private institutions. This suggests that, if there are 
constraints on credit, they are less likely to be affected by political considerations. Working with 
this sector is also convenient as the results are more likely to be relevant for the future. 




Table 1. Participation of Manufacturing Sector 
 
  1985 1990 1994 1997 1999 
Share in GDP  21.9  21.5  21.8  21.3  27.2 
Share in Total Employment  15.6  18.0  17.9  15.6  15.7 
Share in Total Exports  28.1  36.5  45.8  47.1  70.7 
Share in  Exports out of Zonas 
Francas 
N/A N/A 29.4 33.8 36.8 
Number of formal enterprises  N/A  4,463 4,629 5,069 4,884 
 
 
The manufacturing sector has a strong presence in the Costa Rican economy. During the 
1990s, as Table 1 shows, it has averaged approximately 21 percent of GDP and 16 percent of the 
labor force. These shares have remained generally stable, but in the last two years they have 
increased partly due to exporting firms. The importance of the manufacturing sector in the 
exports of Costa Rica is not only significant but has increased and is expected to increase over 
time. This is true even excluding the firms with special tax treatments (Zonas Francas). 
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Figure 2. Employment Size of Active Firms in the Manufacturing Sector: Costa Rica 2000 
 












0 5 0 0 1 0 0 01 5 0 02 0 0 02 5 0 03 0 0 0











































  12The information in these figures is obtained from the Registry of the Costa Rican Social 
Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, or CCSS) for May 2000.  The registry will 
provide the Universe for this paper, and a stratified-random sampling method is used to extract a 
representative group of firms with different sizes and economic activity. As shown in Figure 4, 
small firms are a highly relevant segment in the manufacturing sector: of all active firms in 2000, 
and more than 70 percent have at most 10 employees. There are few large firms. Moreover, as 
Figure 5 indicates, small firms are also important in terms of employment. Roughly speaking, 
firms with fewer than 10 employees account for 10 percent of total manufacturing employment; 
those with at most 50 employees account for more than 30 percent. These figures are 
significantly higher than in developed economies, as already noted by Ulate (2000), Bolaños and 
Gutiérrez (1999) and Yong (1988), among others. 
Available information on the financing of firms is fragmented and outdated.  Most is for 
large firms registered in the National Stock Exchange or in the Electronic Exchange.  This study 
is consequently based on an original survey that includes both large and small firms and that 
focuses on different financing decisions. Such a survey will be helpful in understanding the cross 
section of the firms in the last year. The information will also be linked and compared with the 
information available, which will be discussed below.  
This paper does not make extensive use of the data provided by Coyuntura Industrial a 
Section of the Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas at Universidad de Costa Rica, which has 
periodically surveyed the manufacturing sector since 1980, producing a quarterly index of 
manufacturing activity.  While these surveys are rich in terms of production, employment and 
other indicators, they are inadequate for present purposes for two reasons. First, they do not look 
into financing conditions. Second, they include mostly larger firms. The most comparable study 
dates back to 1994, when the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Academia de 
Centroamérica conducted a survey of the small business sector (commerce, industry and 
services). The survey, centered on financial aspects of small firms, including their birth, sampled 
808 firms with fewer than 20 employees and monthly sales below US$13,000. The results, which 
are reported in Villalobos (1996), are very suggestive of the financing profile of small firms as 
well as the determinants of access to formal credit. The results of the survey conducted for this 
paper are compared with those of Villalobos below. 
  13The results clearly show that small businesses have very limited access to banking credit.  
Table 2 shows the source of funds for firm births. As clearly indicated, the role of formal credit 
is very low, less than 14 percent of the funds required to start up a firm.  The lion’s share of the 
funds originates from entrepeneurs’ personal savings.   
 
Table 2. Start-Up Costs and Ongoing Sources of Financing of Small Business 
 
Start-Up Costs     
    
Personal      59.5 
Friends or Relatives     11.1 
Gifts     10.3 
Trade Credit     5.2 
Formal Credit     13.9 
    
Ongoing Finance     
    
Personal All  38.4 
 Manufacture    40.0 
 Service    33.0 
 Commercial    40.2 
    
Trade Credit   All   29.0 
 Manufacture    12.8 
 Service    23.0 
 Commercial    42.4 
    
Advance payments  All  19.1 
 Manufacture    30.6 
 Service    33.0 
 Commercial    4.3 
    
   
  Source: Authors’ survey and calculations. 
   
Villalobos reports that as many as one third of the entrepreneurs do not have any access 
at all to formal credit. For them, the main source of credit is a supplier and/or advance payments 
by customers. But even those firms with banking credit use banks infrequently and on a small 
scale. Moreover, firms tend to use only one source of funds, and 70 percent use only one 
provider of credit. Table 3 shows that formal credit is much lower than commercial credit and 
  14even lower than transfers and loans from friends and relatives. Those results will be compared 
with the present paper’s findings below. 
 
Table 3. Sources of Finance of Small Business with Multiple Providers of Credit 
   
Type  Last 5 years  Last year 
    
Formal 10.6  5.8 
Informal 5.8  3.8 
Trade Credit  58.7  57.4 
Informal Lender  2.8  2.5 
Friends and Relatives  10.9  5.9 
 
Source: Villalobos (1996). 
 
 
5.  Firm Survey and the Selection of the Sample 
 
The objective in designing the sample was to depict the financing profile of various types of 
firms. For firms with 20 or more employees a representative sample was built from 150 firms 
from the universe of firms used by Coyuntura in the construction of the Index of Industrial 
Activity.  The sample of these “large” firms was stratified according to the different sectors of 
the Index of Industrial Activity and the number of employees in the firm, and firms from each 
sector were randomly chosen.  Two substitutes were selected for each firm.  
A similar sampling scheme was applied to smaller firms (fewer than 20 employees). The 
universe consisted of the set of manufacturing firms registered in the Social Security Fund (Caja 
Costarricense de Seguro Social, or CCSS) as of January 2001.  A representative sample of 500 
firms was extracted from a universe of approximately 5,000 firms, and each selected firm was 
assigned two substitutes, a step that proved very useful later on. The survey was limited to the 
Metropolitan Area, which includes the country’s main cities (San Jose, Alajuela, Heredia and 
Cartago) and most of its industrial production.  
The survey contained different questions for large, medium and small firms. Conducting 
the survey involved approximately 2,900 calls, 500 faxes and more than 600 visits to firms. As 
some of the originally selected firms were closed by the time of the interview, or their phone 
number was incorrect, the sample of substitutes was extensively used.  At the end, with large and 
small firms, 355 questionnaires were collected.  There was a low rate of response for access to 
  15accounting statements, as many firms considered such information confidential. This is the most 
stringent limitation on the information collected. 
The questionnaire was based on the questionnaires employed by Hall and López (2000) 
and Hall and Madrigal (2000) for the borrowers of two commercial banks in Costa Rica and the 
questionnaires used by Bond and Townsend (1996) and Huck, Bond, Rhine and Townsend 
(1999) for the financing options of minority groups in Chicago and in Thailand.
4 
The information collected can be classified into the following categories: 
 
•  Business general description: This includes the most basic information on 
the firms, such as type of activity, location, size of the firm (number of 
employees, total assets), age of the firm, type of ownership, employees, type 
of hiring, time of the current owner and tenure of the current management. 
 
•  Business Performance and Financial Conditions: To investigate the effect 
of access to credit on firms’ performance of firms, information was gathered 
on production, sales, profits, investments, debt, net worth, and total assets. 
 
•  Human capital and related issues: Because the characteristics of the 
manager and/or owner can affect both access to credit and the efficiency of 
the firm, indicators are collected on education, previous experience in related 
activities, ownership of other businesses, family composition, and other 
businesses and occupations. 
 
•  Previous Performance: Previous performance (i.e., a good or bad record on 
loans in the past) can determine whether agents would have access to credit.  
Entrepreneurs were asked about about previous relationships with creditors. 
 
•  Ongoing finance To identify the main forms of financing by different types 
of firms, information was gathered on production, sales, size of investments, 
inventory holdings and other working capital, and payroll. Data was also 
collected on sources of finance (i.e., internal funds or external finance, 
                                                           
4 The authors are grateful to Rob Townsend for providing the authors’ survey of La Villita (Little Village) in 
Chicago. 
  16including banks and other formal intermediaries), trade credit, type of 
relationship with lender (frequency, types of services), suppliers, and informal 
credit including personal and family sources as well other social networks. 
One way to learn about whether credit constraints may be binding is to ask a 
battery of questions such as those in Bond and Townsend (1996) and Huck, 
Rhine, Bond and Townsend (1999).  Included in the survey are questions such 
as:  
1.  Would you invest a windfall in your business? 
2.  Would you be willing to risk all or some of your assets on a new 
 business? 
3.  Would you be willing to swap part of your firm in exchange for a 
 reduction  in  debt? 
4.  Would you like to change the maturity of your debt? 
5.  Would you like to change some of your trade credit for banking credit? 
6.  Do you maintain a long-term relationship with a bank? 
 
The idea of including these qualitative indicators is to extract information 
that would not be available even if ideal information from firms’ financial 
statements were available. For example, investing a windfall in one’s business 
would indicate that there are productive investments available to the entrepreneur. 
If he would invest, it means that at the very least the expected return on those 
investment is above the market interest rate. (One must acknowledge though, that 
the answer to this question may not be as telling in an environment such as Costa 
Rica, where there is a high spread between deposit and lending rates.) The second 
question serves a similar purpose. Here, however, risk-aversion and not 
necessarily credit constraints could be the factor. Yet, with a complete-markets 
(Arrow-Debreu) economy as a benchmark, risk-aversion would not be an issue, as 
agents can fully insure; investment and consumption decision would be separated 
in those cases. Anyway, the answers to these questions could be invalidated by 
issues of risk aversion due to the lack of insurance. Questions 3 and 4 attempt to 
investigate whether the composition of liabilities is directly affected by the lack of 
  17some markets or lack of access to them. A similar objective drives question 5, 
which is specifically geared to banking credit.  
 
•  Start-up finance: As indicated above, it is also worthwhile to investigate 
credit rationing in the entry (extensive) margin. Questions like those stated 
above can be asked but applied to the date when the firm is activated or 
purchased. Information is collected on the firm’s financing at the time of its 
establishment. As in Bond and Townsend (1996) and Huck, Rhine, Bond and 
Townsend (1999), the questions used will distinguish new firms from those 
acquired by the entrepreneur. 
 
•  Shocks and Insurance: Finally, the survey includes a battery of questions 
regarding the possibility of using credit to shield the firm in case of sudden 
needs of liquidity, business opportunities and other shocks. 
 
6. Financing  Profiles 
 
Perhaps the first thing one notices by looking at Tables 4-7 is that banks do not provide the 
majority of credit. Indeed, their participation in financing start-up of firms is very scant. Capital 
for the industrial sector is mostly obtained from entrepreneur’s own funds. Firms with larger 
value or larger employment exhibit a larger co-participation of partners.  Both sources of funds 
add up to roughly 75 percent of total initial needs, while only 14 percent of start-up capital is 
provided by banks. For ongoing firms, however, banks provide 48 percent of total debt.  Notice 
that while banking remains the single most important source, trade and informal credit jointly 
outdo banks. These two sources account for 42 percent and 10 percent, respectively, of the 
average credit of ongoing firms. With some variation, the pattern holds for other firms. Older 
firms, as well as firms with higher value and larger employment, finance their activities with a 
larger portion of private banking credit and a lower share of trade credit and informal credit than 
their counterparts. 
The tables report simple averages of debt composition over the total number of firms.  
Moreover, firms were grouped according to three different characteristics: age, number of 
employees and the reported value of the firm. According to age, firms are classified as young, 
  18mature and old as the firms age varies between 0 to 10 years, 11 to 25 years and more than 25 
years’, respectively.  For employment, firms were grouped into those with fewer than 10 
employees, 10 to 20 employees and more than 20 employees. Finally, 50 million colones 
(approximately US$1.67 million at the time of the survey) was used as the dividing line between 
firms with higher and lower value. Slight variations in the cut-off points did not affect the 
numbers in a significant way. 
Tables 5 and 7 present the number of firms that had employed at least once this source of 
funding at least once. Then, ratios are computed dividing the number of firms that use this source 
of funding at least once by the number of firms that report having employed funding. In grouping 
the firms by age, number of employees and value of the firm, these figures were divided by the 
number of firms within each group. The two tables report only on the extensive margin of 
financing. It is interesting that a similar picture arises if the percentages of debts with the 
fractions of firms using each type of source are considered. 
 
6.1 Startup  Capital 
 
In general, older firms as well as larger value and employment firms present a different strategy 
to finance their startup capital, which combines not only the entrepreneur’s own resources (33 
percent) but also partners’ resources (38 percent).  In contrast, younger firms as well as low 
value and low employment units base their funding on entrepreneurs’ own resources (50 percent) 
and partners’ funds are used in only 22 percent of the cases. Banking credit in the initial 
development of the firm represents only 14 percent of total start-up capital, and there is not a 
major difference between firms when they are grouped by age, employment or value.  A minor 
difference is observed when Cooperativas, banking firms specialized in individuals, are taken 
into consideration.  Cooperativas account for 5 percent and 8 percent of the start-up capital of 
smaller and medium-size firms, respectively, but only 2 percent of the start-up capital for larger 
firms. 
 
6.2 Ongoing  Finance 
 
Firms finance their ongoing activities primarily through banks and suppliers.  The banking sector 
represents on average 48 percent of firms’ total ongoing finance, while suppliers provide 42 
percent.  The informal sector finances 10 percent of total resources. When the sample is 
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points deserve to be mentioned.  In particular, the role of private banking credit increases 
considerably as the sample moves to older firms, firms with a larger number of employees and 
firms with larger value. Moreover, firms with larger value and a larger number of employees use 
less trade credit than their counterparts, as well as less informal credit. 
These general findings can be considered in greater detail.  For the distinction by age, as 
firms grow older they increase their use of the banking sector and reduce informal financing.  In 
particular, the use of private banking increases from 7 percent to 25 percent when firms move 
from Youth to Old Age, and the informal sector’s share declines from 16 percent to 3 percent. In 
the case of trade credit, a u-shaped curve is observed over time; Youth and Old firms have a 
larger participation of trade credit in total financing than mature firms.  In relation to the number 
of employees, as the number of employees increases, financing by means of banking credit tends 
to be higher. This result is especially strong for the case of private banking credit, which moves 
from 4 percent to 33 percent. 
In contrast, informal and trade credit are less used as the number of employees increases.  
For instance, the informal sector averages 17 percent in small firms while it is only 3 percent in 
large ones. Trade credit declines from 49 percent to 30 percent as the number of employees 
increases. Finally, for the case of the value of firms, as the value of firms rises private banking 
credit is more utilized than trade credit.  The private banking credit sector finances 3 percent of 
the activities of firms with low value, while it finances 22 percent for larger valued firms.  The 
values are 52 percent and 33 percent, respectively, for the case of trade credit. 
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Table 4. Start-Up Debt Composition for Industrial Firms 
 
Start Up Finance Composition 
    Firm Age  Employees  Firm Value 
Variable Average  Youn
g 
Mature Old  Less 10 From 10 to 20  More 20 Less 50 million  More 50 million 
Banking Credit  14.0  12.0  14.0  1.0  13.0  16.0  12.0  15.0  14.0 
Private lender  1.0  2.0  2.0  1.0  1.0  3.0  1.0  2.0  1.0 
Governmental Program  1.0  2.0  1.0  0.0  1.0  0.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Relatives 3.0  1.0             3.0 3.0  1.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 4.0
Suppliers and Clients  2.0  1.0  .0  1.0  3.0  2.0  1.0  3.0  2.0 
Cooperative 6.0  5.0  8.0  2.0  6.0          6.0 4.0 7.0 3.0
Total Loans  26.0%  23.0
% 
31.0% 23.0% 26.0%          31.0% 23.0% 30.0% 24.0%
Presents                 4.0 6.0 2.0 7.0  5.0 5.0 3.0 5.0 2.0
Personal Resources  44.0%  50.0
% 
47.0% 33.0% 51.0%          51.0% 23.0% 49.0% 31.0%
Partners              25.0% 22.0
% 
21.0% 38.0% 19.0% 14.0% 51.0% 17.0% 42.0%











Table 5. Percentage of Firms using Alternative Sources of Start-Up Finance 
 
Percentage of Firms 
    Firm Age  Employees  Firm Value 
Variable Average  Young Mature Old  Less
10 
  From 10 to 20  More 20 Less 50 million  More 50 million 
Banking  Credit                    19.9 15.2 17.4 17.0 17.0 16.0 10.4 21.1 14.9
Private  Lender                    2.4 2.9 2.1 0.9 1.3 3.0 1.7 3.0 0.7
Governmental  Program                    1.0 1.9 0.7 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.9 0.6 1.5
Relatives  4.0                  2.9 4.9 1.9 1.9 4.0 3.5 3.6 4.5
Suppliers  and  Clients                    3.4 3.8 3.5 0.9 3.8 2.0 0.9 4.2 2.2
Cooperative  7.7                  7.6 9.0 1.9 7.5 6.0 3.5 9.6 3.0
Total Loans  35.0%  28.6% 35.4% 21.7% 29.6% 31.0%  20.0%      39.2% 23.9%
Presents  5.4                  5.7 2.8 5.7 5.7 5.0 1.7 6.6 2.2
Personal Resources  53.2%  53.3% 50.0% 28.3% 57.2% 51.0%        20.0% 57.8% 28.4%
Partners 30.0%  23.8% 22.2% 30.2% 20.1% 14.0%        37.4% 19.3% 37.3%











Table 6. Ongoing Finance Composition 
 
Ongoing Finance Composition 
    Firm Age  Employees  Firm Value 
Variable  Average  Young Mature Old  Less 10  From 10 to 20  More 
20 
Less 50 million  More 50 million 
Banking Sector  48.0%            35.0% 53.0% 53.0% 34.0% 43.0% 67.0% 34.0% 57.0%
Public  Banks  20.0                  12.0 28.0 16.0 17.0 25.0 20.0 19.0 19.0
Private Banks  14.0  7.0  11.0  25.0  4.0  3.0  33.0  3.0  22.0 
Other  Formal                    14.0 16.0 14.0 11.0 13.0 15.0 14.0 13.0 17.0
Informal Sector  10.0%              16.0% 12.0% 3.0% 17.0% 10.0% 3.0% 14.0% 10.0%
Relatives  6.0                  8.0 8.0 2.0 10.0 7.0 1.0 8.0 6.0
Other Informal  4.0  8.0  3.0  1.0  6.0  3.0  2.0  6.0  4.0 
Suppliers  42.0%            49.0% 35.0% 44.0% 49.0% 47.0% 30.0% 52.0% 33.0%












Table 7. Percentage of Firms using Alternative Sources of Ongoing Finance 
 
Percentage of Firms 
    Firm Age  Employees  Firm Value 
Variable  Average  Young Mature Old  Less 10  From 10 to 20  More 
20 
Less 50 million  More 50 million 
Banking Sector  60.0%            37.0% 45.0% 43.0% 28.0% 43.0% 61.0% 32.0% 59.0%
Public  Banks  27.8                  16.2 23.6 17.9 14.5 24.7 23.5 17.5 23.9
Private Banks  21.0  9.5  11.1  25.5  3.8  6.2  36.5  3.0  29.1 
Other  Formal                    21.4 18.1 14.6 13.2 11.9 17.3 18.3 13.3 21.6
Informal Sector  18.7%              19.0% 15.3% 4.7% 15.7% 17.3% 7.0% 15.7% 15.7%
Relatives  11.1                  8.6 10.4 3.8 8.8 12.3 3.5 8.4 10.4
Other Informal  7.9  11.4  4.9  0.9  6.9  6.2  3.5  7.2  6.0 
Suppliers  64.7%            51.4% 41.0% 47.2% 42.1% 54.3% 45.2% 47.6% 50.0%
                
 
 
  247.  Determinants of Access to Banking Credit 
As shown in the previous section, access to formal banking credit is far from widespread. While 
the evidence collected is only for the manufactures sector, but we strongly believe that the results 
apply in general. Indeed, our results indicate that things have not changed dramatically since the 
study by Villalobos (1996). As discussed above, the lack of formal banking credit does not 
involve only intensity of use, as many firms do not use banking credit at all.  It seems interesting, 
and potentially important, to treat the intensive and extensive margins explicitly, and this section 
does so with simple and well-known econometric tools.   
If the objective were only to examine whether a firm receives credit at all, dichotomous 
Probit models would be sufficient. In such models firms would be classified into two groups: 
those with some banking credit and those with no banking credit at all. The probability that a 
firm belongs to either group as a function of the observable characteristics would then be 
estimated. A Probit model, however, does not make use of all the information available, as it 
neglects the intensity of use of credit by firms with banking credit. To include that information, a 
Tobit model is used. The intensity of use will be measured by the share of banking credit in total 
credit. 
To be more specific, let yi indicate the fraction of debt of firm debt i that is owed to 
banks; let yi be an indicator variable of whether the firm has formal banking credit at all (i.e., 
yi=1 if yi
*>0 and yi=0 if yi
*=0). Finally, let xi be a vector of observable characteristics of the 
firm. (All of these variables are obtained from the survey.) It is assumed that the relationship 
between xi and yi
* is given by the simple form 
i i i x y ε β + ′ =
*  
Here β is a vector of parameters and εi is the unobserved and random heterogeneity of the 
firm.  A firm will have no banking credit at all if εi<-β'xi. Letting f and F denote the p.d.f. and 
c.d.f. functions of ε, expressions can be written down for the probabilities. The probability that 
the firm i receives no credit at all is thus F(-β'xi). Thus, if the parameters of β are known, the 
probability of observing in the sample a firm with given characteristics (yi,xi) is F(-β'xi)
1-yi[1-F(-
β'xi)]
yi. On the other hand, the probability of observing a firm with characteristics (yi
*,yi,xi) will 
be given by F(-β'xi)
1-yif(-β'xi)
yi. 
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functions:  and    
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The variables xi in this study contain information on the firm (age, assets, employment, 
type of ownership, total debt, etc) including their industrial sector, as well as the characteristics 
of the owner or manager (age, sex, education, ownership of a house, previous experience, etc.) 
and the owner’s their response about whether they would like to change their financing profile.  
Table 8 defines the variables names used below. We will report first the results for the finances 
of ongoing firms. In the last part of this section, we report the results for the finances of the firms 
at the time of their activation. 
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Name Variable  Definition 
   
Bankrel  A dummy equal to 1 if the entrepreneur’s reports he/ she has a long term 
relationship with a bank. 
Bactdeb  Ratio of total banking credit to total debt. 
Bancred  1 if the firm has ongoing banking credit 0 otherwise. 
Exastdbt  1 if the owner would exchange assets for lower debt. 
Exsupdbt  1 if the owner would exchange supplier debt for banking debt. 
Finstat  1 if the firm has accounting statement 0 otherwise. 
Ftypown  1 if the firm is stock company 0 otherwise. 
Hgsch  1 if the owner has high school education 0 otherwise. 
House  A dummy variable with one if the entrepreneur owns a house. 
Initdebt  Total start up investment. 
LnEmplo
y 
Log. of Employment of the firm. 
LnAge  Log. of  Age of the owner of the firm. 
LnFage  Log. of Age of the firm. 
LnFvalue  Log. Of Value of the firm in colones. 
Onbkdbt  Total amount of total ongoing debt in colones. 
Othinc  1 if the owner reports other sources of income besides the firm. 
Prexp  Previous experience. Dummy variable, 1 if the owner had a business before. 
Profrate  Profit rate. 
Reinvest  Rate of re-investment out of total profits. 
Secalim  Dummy variable, equal to 1, if the firm is in the food sector. 
Secmad  Dummy variable, equal to 1, if the firm is in the wood sector. 
Secmetal  Dummy variable, equal to 1, if the firm is in the metal sector. 
Secpapel  Dummy variable, equal to 1, if the firm is in the paper sector. 
Secquim  Dummy variable, equal to 1, if the firm is in the chemical sector. 
Sectex  Dummy variable, equal to 1, if the firm is in the textile sector. 
Sex  Sex of the owner of the firm: 1 if female, 0 otherwise. 
Special  If the manager and the owner are different persons. 
Startcred
t 
1 if firm used start up banking credit 0 otherwise. 
Startperc  Ratio of start up banking credit to total start up investment. 
Unived  1 If the owner has university education 0 otherwise. 






  277.1   Results for Banking Credit in Ongoing Finances 
 
Experiments were attempted with many different combinations of the variables obtained in the 
survey. Here, however, only the most interesting are reported.
5  The purpose is to find out if any 
of the characteristics of the firm and of the entrepreneur can explain the use of banking credit.  
Firm characteristics that are included are the firm’s age, size (log-of number of 
employees) and leverage  (total debt/assets). Entrepreneur indicators are his/her age, whether 
they have other sources of income, owned a house, had previous experience as entrepreneur and 
the fraction of the firm initially financed by banks. 
Estimates are reported for specifications that focus exclusively on the characteristics of 
the firm, on the characteristics of the entrepreneur and specifications that include both. 
Specifically, the following four models are estimated. Model 1 includes almost all information 
on the characteristics of the entrepreneur and of the firm. Model 2 excludes from Model 1 the 
size of the firm and its leverage; the rationale is that these variables could be better seen as the 
outcome of access to credit and not a factor responsible for it. Model 3 focuses on the 
characteristics of the entrepreneur and thus excludes firm characteristics. Finally, Model 4 
focuses on firm characteristics. This model also includes the value of the firm as an explanatory 
variable. While the (self-assessed) value of the firm can be seen as being affected by credit 
constraints, this variable is included here in order to determine if its inclusion in the regression 
would affect the results for the other variables, including their value.   
Tables 9 and 10 show the results for the Probit and the Tobit models, respectively. In 
these tables, as well as the subsequent tables, there are two rows for each variable.  The first 
contains the estimated coefficient, while the second contains the t-statistic under the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient is zero. All the estimations included dummies for the industrial 
sector of the firm, but they are not be included in the tables for three reasons. First, these 
dummies are not statistically significant. Second, inter-sector differences per se are not a matter 
of direct interest for this paper. Third, omitting the dummies keeps the tables at a manageable 
size.  
 
                                                           
5 The database is available from the authors upon request. 
  28Table 9. Determinants of Access to Credit: Probit Model on Ongoing Finance 
(Numbers in the second raw of each variable are the t-statistics under the hypothesis that the 
coefficient is zero) 
 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Constant -1.3453  0.4056  0.4664 -7.6305 
 -0.642  0.226  0.267  -4.59*** 
STARTPER -0.2763  -0.0643  0.0030   
 -0.746  -0.205  0.01   
BANKREL 0.4544  0.4247  0.4120  0.3535 
 1.898*  2.055**  2.025**  1.56 
FINSTAT 0.4926  0.5239    -0.1009 
 1.739*  2.127**    -0.376 
LNAGE -0.3376  -0.5437  -0.4706   
 -0.602  -1.097  -1.021   
LNFAGE 0.2736 0.0418    0.1011 
 1.482  0.273    0.632 
SEX -0.2196  0.0670  0.1072  
 -0.611  0.207  0.339   
HOUSE 0.1698  0.3599 0.3527   
 0.485  1.129  1.123   
OTHINC -0.1081  -0.0196  0.0344   
 -0.432  -0.09  0.16   
FTYPOWN -0.1925  -0.0854  0.0935   
 -0.694  -0.367  0.43   
LEVER 1.2157      1.6796 
 2.571**      3.617*** 
LNEMPLO
Y 
0.3339    0.0573 
 2.754***      0.432 
LNFVALU
E 
     0.3558 
       3.496*** 
        
# Obs  164  189  189  180 
 




  29Table 10. Determinants of Access to Credit: Tobit Model on Ongoing Finance 
(Numbers in the second raw of each variable are the t-statistics under the hypothesis that 
the coefficient is zero) 
 




3  Model 4
Constant -0.4092 0.1423 0.1471 -3.3700 
 -0.247  0.085  0.088 -3.025***
STARTPER -0.4181 -0.1720 -0.1021   
 -1.408  -0.577 -0.338  
FINSTAT 0.4018  0.4767   0.1041 
 1.754*  2.018**   0.474 
LNAGE -0.3643 -0.4590 -0.3597   
 -0.812  -0.987 -0.809  
LNFAGE 0.1655  0.0838   0.0585 
 1.211  0.584    0.472 
SEX -0.2662 -0.0358 0.0224  
 -0.92  -0.118 0.074  
HOUSE 0.2210  0.3540 0.3598  
 0.783  1.163  1.175  
BANKREL 0.3791  0.3987 0.3886 0.2179 
 1.966** 2.018** 1.953* 1.181 
OTHINC -0.1119 -0.0227 0.0337  
 -0.561  -0.111 0.163  
FTYPOWN -0.1058 -0.0353 0.1268  
 -0.483  -0.162 0.607  
LNEMPLOY 0.2675      0.1628 
 2.767***     1.575 
LEVER 0.0246      0.0325 
 1.705*      2.064**
LNFVALUE      0.1228 
       1.796* 
        
# Obs.  164  189  189  180 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
 
 
As can be seen in both tables and in all four specifications, personal characteristics of 
entrepreneurs do not appear to have a significant effect on either the probability of having 
banking credit or the share of credit that comes from banks. In all cases, it seems that the age of 
the entrepreneur has a negative effect, but it is never significant. Consistent with the view that 
  30women may experience greater difficulty in obtaining credit, the estimates on the sex dummy 
frequently show a negative sign, but it also is never statistically significant.  Ownership of a 
house shows a positive sign, but the result is not significant.   
With respect to other income, it is less obvious what sign to expect. On one hand, 
individuals with other sources of income should have better access to banks. On the other hand, 
individuals with other sources of income can more easily self-finance. The results obtained, 
though not significant, would tend to support the second hypothesis.   
Potentially more interestingly is that, with the exception of one regression, the percentage 
of initial capital from banking credit shows a negative relationship with banks’ share in the 
current credit of firms.  This may appear odd, as firms that were funded by banks in the first 
place would seem more likely to maintain an ongoing relationship with banks, and included in 
the regressions is a dummy variable indicating whether the entrepreneur considers that he or she 
has an ongoing relationship with banks. However, the negative point estimates remain even if the 
dummy is not included. In any event, the results are never statistically significant.  
Firm characteristics are more significant. Tables 9 and 10 report only the results for the 
models discussed above. However, many different variations were estimated. The main problem 
in extracting conclusions from these regressions is the high degree of collinearity among firm 
characteristics including age, number of employees, and value. All these variable tend to move in 
the same direction. 
Estimating the Probit and Tobit models, respectively, with the probability of banking 
credit and its fraction over total credit, using only size (number of employees), value or age, as 
the only explanatory variable, always renders positive and statistically significant estimates. 
With the exception of firm’s age, those results, which are not shown here, are robust to inclusion 
of the entrepreneur’s characteristics. The problem arises when several of these characteristics are 
included at the same time.  
The value of the firm is the most robust predictor of the firm’s access to banking credit. 
Regardless of which of the other variables are included, the estimated effect of value of the firm 
remains positive and statistically significant. On the other hand, as long as the value of the firm 
is not included, both the size of the firm in terms of the (log of) number of employees and the 
dummy of formal accounting procedures have a positive and significant effect. Including the 
  31value of the firm eliminates both results, an indication that the value of the firm provides the 
same information. 
Model 4 includes leverage in order to control for the total debt of the firm and to study 
what determines the share that is financed by formal financial intermediaries.  The expected sign 
in all equations is positive, as firms that need more credit would try harder to obtain it from 
cheaper sources. The point estimates are positive in both, the Probit and Tobit models, but 
interestingly, they are much more significant in the Probit model. These results suggest that firms 
in great need of credit will make extra efforts in obtaining it from banks. Alternatively, causality 
may work in the opposite direction. Firms with access to banks may make more intense use of 
credit. With the data available it is impossible to distinguish which direction of causality is the 
most relevant.  
A word of warning is in order. As indicated above, “characteristics” such as number of 
employees, value, use of formal accounting procedures and even type of ownership are all 
outcomes of the past, current and expected future behavior and performance of the firm, and, 
obviously, these cannot be assumed to be independent of access to credit. Yet, at any point in 
time, those characteristics must determine access to banking credit in the period.  If panel data 
were available, it would be possible attempt different identification schemes to estimate the 
direct effect of those firm’s outcome characteristics on their access to banking credit. The lack of 
panel data on firms, however, is precisely the main limitation encountered in this project.   
 
7.2 Start-Up  Finances 
 
It is widely believed that credit constraints are more stringent for younger firms than for older 
and better established ones. If that is the case, then credit limitations should be the most stringent 
precisely at entry, i.e., when an entrepreneur starts a new business. Indeed, the previous section 
finds that banking credit is a significantly more important source of resources for established 
firms than for newly created ones. In this sense, the evidence is consistent with the view that 
banking credit is harder to obtain for new firms.  As in the previous subsection, the objective 
now is to investigate which characteristics of firms and of entrepreneurs explain their access to 
banks. The inherent limitations of using retrospective data, though, must be acknowledged from 
the beginning. The ideal would be to collect information on firms just entering at the time of the 
  32survey, but a good registry of new firms is not available. Moreover, the small size of the country 
will likely limit the applicability of statistical methods.   
 
Table 11.  Determinants of Access to Credit: Financing the Start Up 
(Numbers in the second raw of each variable are the t-statistics under the hypothesis that 
the coefficient is zero) 
Variable Probit Tobit
Constant -1.5203  -1.414 
 -2.475*** -2.316***
PREXP -0.4715  -0.5016 
 -1.977**  -2.15** 
FINSTAT 0.2267  0.3172 
 0.996  1.445 
FTYPOWN 0.19  0.1298 
 0.833  0.598 
HOUSE 0.1972  0.1257 
 0.643  0.431 
SEX -0.105  -0.0077 
 -0.328  -0.025 
SECALIM 0.2758  0.2265 
 0.576  0.508 
SECTEX 0.6883  0.5337 
 1.446  1.194 
SECMAD 0.3664  0.2762 
 0.72  0.578 
SECPAPEL 1.0047  0.8248 
 2.064**  1.801* 
SECQUIM -0.0857  -0.3672 
 -0.152  -0.664 
SECMETAL 0.4017 0.357 
 0.874  0.834 
    
Number obs  225  222 
 
                                         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
 
 
As with ongoing finances, Probit and Tobit models are used to estimate the share of 
banking credit as a function of observable characteristics; Table 11 shows some of the results. 
Many different specifications were tried, involving most of the recorded characteristics of 
entrepreneurs and firms. Contrary to expectations, though, the variables on the schooling 
attainment of the owner were never significant; moreover, they tended to change signs depending 
on the other regressors included. Because of that, it did seem worthwhile to report any estimates 
  33on the owner’s education. Moreover, they did not affect the significance of the other variables. 
Other characteristics of the owner, such as gender or home ownership, were not significant, but 
the sign of the estimate remained mostly unchanged with the different sets of regressors. Indeed, 
while not significant, having a house is positively associated with obtaining banking credit. Also, 
women appear to have more difficulties in obtaining credit. The direction of these results is as 
expected, but again, the estimates are not statistically significant.  The table also shows that in 
the case of start-up financing, the sector of the firm can significantly affect access to banking 
credit.  This is contrary to the case of ongoing finance, partly because in that instance more 
characteristics of the firm were included.  
The most robust finding is that there is a negative and significant relationship between the 
use of banking credit and whether the owner had previous experience as an entrepreneur at the 
time of starting the firm. To some extent this is surprising. One would expect that entrepreneurs 
with previous experience may have accumulated useful skills and knowledge to successfully 
manage the new firm. Creditors would be expected to be willing to lend resources if they had a 
positive estimate of previous experience. A negative, significant effect can be explained by very 
different reasons, which cannot be determined on the basis of the data collected.  One possibility 
is that previous experience is indicating failures in the past. As such, a bad record as entrepreneur 
could convey negative information (a stigma) from the point of view of the bankers.  An 
alternative explanation is that banking credit is hard to obtain for young firms but for reasons 
completely independent of the previous experience (failure or success) of the firm. A negative 
sign could be explained if previous experience denotes previous successes that allowed the 
entrepreneur to accumulate the resources necessary for the new firm. Those entrepreneurs would 
be self-financing their projects, eliminating the need for banks. A third alternative is that 
entrepreneurs with previous experience may find it easier to obtain credit from other firms in the 
sector.  All these hypotheses remain possible, as the available data do not allow distinctions to be 
made among them.   
 
8.  Credit Constraints and Firm Performance 
 
What is the effect of access to formal banking credit on the behavior and performance of firms? 
In general, banking credit is less expensive than other types, such as trade and informal credit. 
Thus, having access to banking credit will affect firms in a variety of margins, ranging from their 
  34profits (and hence their net value) as well as their size and investment decisions.  Moreover, 
credit market frictions also affect the creation, liquidation and growth of the population of firms 
in the economy.
6 Consequently, better access to credit implies that more small firms will be 
created and fewer will be destroyed. Firms with better access to credit will grow faster, and 
active firms will be larger. Thus, in equilibrium, the extent of firms’ access to banking credit 
would enhance the mass of active firms. Still, the implications for the shape of the cross-section 
distribution of active firms are not easy to determine. 
A controlled experiment would provide the ideal method for assessing the effect of 
access to formal credit markets.  Such an experiment would include two large groups of 
individuals, identical in all respects except for access to formal credit markets.  If the two groups 
could be followed over time, it would then be possible to record and compare firms’ size, 
growth, profits, and investment, as well as their entry (firm activation decisions), exit (firm 
liquidation) and life span. In such an ideal scenario, one could unambiguously assess the effect 
of having access to formal markets in all these dimensions of firm behavior, and one could even 
make strong welfare conclusions.  
Of course, such experiments are not available. Yet, thinking of such hypothetical 
exercises helps to situate the limitations and visualize the potential biases of estimations using 
actual data. First of all, data are available only on active firms.  Indeed, credit-constrained firms 
are more likely than others to liquidate early, and the lack of good credit alternatives might 
prevent such firms from being created at all. Credit-constrained firms thus may not be observed 
at all at the time of collecting the sample. One can hardly imagine a tougher problem than that of 
predicting how a cross-section of firms would look if financial markets were different! 
A more limited objective would be to study the effect of credit constraints on the 
behavior of surviving firms if a set of firms with access to different credit markets could be 
followed. In this case, omitting survival biases, one would be able to contrast the behavior of 
investment and other measures of firms’ behavior. The main challenge in this case would be to 
identify variables that determine access to formal banking credit and do not affect the 
performance of the firm directly. Schiantarelli (1996) discusses panel GMM methods to address 
this problem specifically, but the aforementioned lack of available panel data on Costa Rica 
unfortunately makes it impossible to adopt these methods.  
                                                           
6 See, for example, Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2001) and Monge (2001). 
  35Using the cross-section data collected in the survey, this section explores two different 
econometric methods in an attempt to isolate the effects of credit constraints on the behavior and 
performance of firms.  Of particular interest is the effect of having access to bank credit. The 
econometric problem that arises is that of sample selection: firms with and without access may 
be inherently different, and measures of their behavior and performance may determine the 
extent to which firms have credit.  
As made clear by the dynamic limited enforcement models of Albuquerque and 
Hopenhayn  (2001), Hart and Moore (1994) and Monge (2001), the characteristics of firms at 
any point in time are the result of their previous behavior and access to credit.  Those models 
also imply that the value and (observable) productivity and profits of a firm explicitly determine 
the credit that they can obtain. Thus, anyone interested in estimating the effect of credit 
constraints on dimensions of firms’ behavior, must necessarily face the identification problem of 
controlling for the effect of those observable characteristics on the credit received. The following 
subsection discusses a methodology that imposes functional and distributional form assumptions 
to explicitly handle the identification problem.  
 
8.1  Effect of Banking Credit I: A Two-Step Parametric Method 
 
The most natural way to assess the effects of having access to banking credit would be to run a 
simple regression of the form: 
 
i i i i X y p ε β γ + + =  
 
where  pi denotes alternative measures of interest on the performance of  firm i;  yi denotes 
whether the firm i has banking credit; and Xi denotes observable characteristics of the same firm. 
Here εi indicates random, unobserved heterogeneity. 
While intuitive, such an approach will not necessarily render consistent estimates of γ, the 
effect of access on the performance on the firm. At the very least, one must recognize that one 
does not observe a purely random sample of (pi,yi,Xi).  To see that, imagine that there is a set of  
firms with the same characteristics Xi  , and randomly some firms are allowed to have credit 
(yi,=1) and others are not (yi,=0). Under these circumstances, one could consistently estimate the 
effect of credit by the difference in the estimated means of the performances. Now, if there are 
firms with different characteristics Xi  , as long as the sampling is random, OLS will consistently 
  36estimate the effect of credit. The problem is that having access to banking credit is indeed the 
result of a market equilibrium, and, as such, it is quite possible that a set of variables affects both 
firm performance and access to credit. Using the previous equation, the problem is that whether a 
firm has credit may depend on (Xi  εi). Clearly, the key problem is that there is no way to observe 
the counterfactual performance that firms that received credit would have displayed if they had 
not had no access. Also, there is no way to observe the performance that firms with no credit 
would have displayed if they had enjoyed access to it. This problem could be solved if such a 
counterfactual could be estimated. 
This  sample selectivity problem is well known in the economics literature. This 
subsection adopts a strategy originally developed by labor economists, most notably Heckman 
(1974 and 1979). Consider having a sample of firms, a cross-section, (pi,yi,Xi,Wi)  where, as 
before, pi indicates some measure of performance, yi indicates whether the firm has banking 
credit, and Xi,Wi are vectors of observable characteristics of the firms. 
As before, assume that 
 
i i i i X y p ε β γ + + =  
 
It is also assumed that the condition of whether a firm has access is given by an index 
model. There is a latent variable y* given by  
 
i W y i i ν α + =
*  
 
where νi is a random component. Whether a firm has banking credit or not is given by 
 
        1  if yi
*>0 
      yi  =  
              0  otherwise 
 
In order to parametrically estimate the model, Heckman assumes that (εi,νi) are jointly 




ν,, ρσεσν for 
some ρ ∈[-1,1].  Under these assumptions, one can compute the conditional expectations of the 
performance of the firms with and without access. Indeed, the mean performance, conditional on 
having credit and the observable characteristics of the firms is 
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where φ and Φ are, respectively, the pdf and cdf functions of a standard normal. The last line 
follows from the normality assumption. A similar expression can be obtained for E[pi|Xi,yi=0]. 
Thus, if the value of the parameter α were known, it would be possible to simply add the 
term λi=[φ(αWi)/Φ(αWi)] in the right hand side of the equation. In this way, consistent estimates 
of (γ,β) would be obtained. The problem is that the exact value of α is not known. 
This discussion suggests a method for estimating the model, precisely because one can 
consistently estimate α by simply estimating a Probit (which, again, is warranted, given the 
normality assumption). This is precisely what the methods advocated by Heckman and others do. 
First, estimate α via maximum likehood on a probit. Second, obtain the values for λi, i.e., the 
inverse Mill’s ratios (φ/Φ) for each firm of each type, firms with and without formal banking 





The previous methods are applied to estimating the effect of banking credit on several measures 
of performance. Here it must be emphasized that separating exogenous characteristics and 
measures of behavior and performance is necessarily an arbitrary exercise. All observable 
characteristics recorded for each firm are derived from its history.  
In any event, an attempt is made to determine the effect of banking credit on the 





                                                          
Log of Employment;  
Profit Rate as a fraction of initial net assets; 
Total Investment;
8 and 
Investment as a fraction of net earnings. 
 
 
7 In this last step, one must correct the standard error to account for the fact that an estimate of α has been used 
instead of its actual value. 
8 We use total investment instead of log of investment to include firms with zero investment. 
  38As exogenous characteristics, these exercises will take the following: 
Firm indicators: age, accounting system, type of ownership;   • 
• 
• 
Entrepreneur’s indicators: age, sex, etc; and 
Dummy variables to control for different sectors. 
 
In all cases, indicators were included of the characteristics of the owner and of whether 
the firm is managed by the owner or by someone else.  The results reported here do not include 
leverage, as it could be highly correlated with access to banking credit. The results did not 
change dramatically, however, when leverage was included. The value of the firm was included 
in neither the performance equation nor the probability equation.  
Sector dummies are not statistically significant at conventional levels, and their exclusion 
from the equations did not change the main results. Table 12 reports the results of the regressions 
including sector dummies, but the estimates are not included to keep the size of the table small. 
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Table 12.  Banking Credit and Firm Performance 
(Numbers in the second row of each variable are the t-statistics under the hypothesis that the coefficient is zero) 
 
Variable 
              
log.Employment Total  Investment  Profit Rate  % Reinvest Earnings 
           
 
             
Constant           
         
         
       
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
         
           
3.21 -7.81E+07 0.87 94.16
3.07 ***
 
-0.46 0.51 2.26 ***
SEX 0.43 -6.63E+07 -0.04 -5.04
2.07 *** -2.06 *** -0.11 -0.63
LNAGE -0.53 2.83E+07 -0.26 -8.37
-1.95 ** 0.65 -0.59 -0.77
LNFAGE -0.08 -1.73E+07 -0.08 -6.48
-0.48 -0.62 -0.29 -0.97
FINSTAT 0.06 -6.12E+07 -0.72 -20.34
0.11 -0.80 -1.02 -1.07
FTYPOWN
 
0.20 3.31E+07 -0.03 11.74
1.46 1.54 -0.13 2.23 ***
                         
BANCRED 2.28 4.23E+08 3.57 107.98
 1.01       
           
         
          
               
1.22 1.09   1.27
LAMBDA
 







# Obs.  185    173   109   185  
                         
                       * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
 
  40Regardless of the specific measure of behavior/performance, to carry out these exercises 
one must impose assumptions on which variables belong to both the access equation and the 
performance/behavior equation.  Specifically, it is necessary to assume that some variables affect 
only the performance and not the probability of accessing credit. Many different specifications, 
some of which were reported in previous versions of the paper, have been explored.  
The results reported here are for the case in which the probability of having access to 
banking credit is specified only as a function of the (log of) age of the firm and whether the firm 
has formal accounting practices.
9 The previous section found that the use of financial statements 
and the value of the firm are the best predictors of access to credit.  The current exercises use the 
age of the firm instead of the value of the firm because endogeneity problems are more severe 
with firm’s value than with firm’s age. The performance of the firms was then specified to be a 
function of the age of the firm, whether it has financial statements, and other characteristics, such 
as type of ownership and the sex and age of the manager. As explained above, the effect of 
banking credit can be estimated by including the dummy variable bancred, and the estimates are 
consistent as long as the estimated Mill’s ratio from the probability equation is included. 
 Under these assumptions, the model is identified. While the identification assumptions 
are in principle ad hoc, it is important to notice that similar results were obtained under a wide 
variety of alternative identification assumptions. Table 12 shows the results for all four measures 
of performance.  The table shows that for the most part the characteristics of the firms do not 
affect the performance of the firms. The same applies for the sector dummies (not reported here).  
In the versions that included the total leverage of the firm, this variable had in general a 
significant positive effect on the performance of firms. In the versions in which the variable 
uselott was included in the performance equation, that variable was also a significant predictor of 
the reinvestment rate, but not of the other performance measures.  
The results suggest that access to banking credit has a positive effect on performance. In 
all cases, the estimates on bancred have a positive sign and are large (though it should be kept in 
mind that employment is logged).  Unfortunately, the results are not statistically significant. For 
                                                           
9 The previous version of the paper reported the results of the exercises including qualitative indicators such as 
willingness to exchange assets for debt (Exastdbt), whether the entrepeneur would use a lottery windfall to invest in 
the firm (uselott) and Exsupdbt (whether the entrepreneur would want to exchange suppliers/trade credit for banking 
credit) affecting the probability of receiving banking credit. Leverage was also excluded in the performance 
equation but not the probability equation, because it has so much predictive power in the probits that it would cause 
  41instance, the point estimates indicate that just having access to bank credit would increase the 
(natural) log of employment by 2.28, almost 10 more employees in each firm. The implied size 
of the effects on total investment, profit rate and reinvestment rate are so large that they cannot 
be taken seriously. But they signal that, if statistically significant, the effects are large.  
The t-statistics, however, are low.  In general, the values are around one but not 
significant at any relevant significance level. The present data do not permit strong conclusions, 
but the results are highly suggestive.  
In all cases, the correction for selection provides a negative estimate for the coefficient on 
λ. Once bancred is directly included on the performance equation, the fact that the firm is likely 
or unlikely to have access to bank credit does not enhance or diminish its performance. Indeed, 
the estimated effect goes in the opposite direction. In no case, however, are the results 
significant. 
It turns out that the results reported in Table 12 are very robust to changes in the variables 
included in both regressions. This is not surprising, as the RHS variables are rarely significant. 
Experiments with eliminating some of the variables or including indicators of human capital of 
the owner, previous experience, or credit indicators at the time of the start-up of the business 
resulted in no substantial change: the sign for bancred and lambda remained positive and 
negative. While in very few cases the coefficients turned out to be significant from zero for some 
of the performance measures, those cases were easy to overturn by small changes in the set of 
regressors.
10 
To summarize, the results tentatively suggest that having access to credit constraints can 
have large effects on the size (employment), investment and profits of firms. However, even 
under the strong functional form assumptions inherent in the method, the data do not provide 
enough information to statistically reject the alternative hypothesis of no effect at all, at least at 
the significance levels traditionally used. 
 
8.2  Effect of Banking Credit II: Non-Parametric Bounds 
 
As stressed above, the previous methods hinge heavily on functional and distributional form 
assumptions. Those methods are parsimonious and commonly used, and there is no doubt that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
singularities in the performance equation. The qualitative results in terms of signs, magnitude and significance of the 
estimates on bancred and sample selection are the same as those discussed in the current version of the paper.  
  42they are an essential exercise in investigating the effect of credit constraints. It is important to 
emphasize that in the present application the equations are not derived from any economic 
structural model; therefore, the estimates are simple reduced form effects, not directly 
interpretable parameters. As such, functional forms and distributional assumptions are not 
fundamentals of the problem, but rather additional assumptions imposed to solve it. This section 
explores a set of methods that completely dispense with functional and distributional form 
assumptions. Imposing less structure increases the robustness of the conclusions, but this comes 
at the price of necessarily reducing the sharpness of the possible conclusions.  
This section adopts the general methods developed mostly by Manski (1995) and Manski 
and Horowitz (1995) to analyze the response to treatments. As before, access to banking credit is 
seen as a “treatment.” It is also explicitly recognized that there is a selection bias problem, as the 
characteristics of firms endogenously determine whether they have access to credit from banks. 
Because these methods are not yet common tools, they are explained below in some detail.  
Specifically, consider a population of J firms. Each firm j∈J has observable 
characteristics xj, and will have performance/behavior yj(t). That performance/behavior can occur 
in two mutually exclusive cases: the firm has no access to banking credit t=0 or, t=1, the firm 
has access to banking credit. Firm j has a realized access to credit zj∈{0,1} and a realized 
outcome yj. As before, the selection problem arises because the latent outcomes yj(t), t≠zj, are not 
observable, i.e., the econometrician does not observe the (counterfactual) performance that firms 
that received credit would have displayed if they did not have access as well as the performance 
that firms that did not receive credit would have displayed if they had enjoyed access. 
From a random sample of the population of firms, a researcher can learn the empirical 
distribution P(x, z, y) of covariates, realized performance/behavior measures, and realized access 
to banks.  The researcher’s problem is to combine this empirical evidence with (identification) 
assumptions in order to learn about the distribution of response functions. Of particular interest is 
the average effect of access to banking credit, 
 
] x | ) 0 ( [ ] x | ) 1 ( [ y E y E −  
 
Results are reported from the use of three different methods developed by Manski and 
Horowitz that are routinely used in this literature: Worst-Case Bounds, Exogenous Selection and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
10 As with the data set, the LIMDEP codes used for these regressions are available from the authors upon request. 
  43Instrumental Variables Bounds. The methods look to extract the most robust conclusions from 
the data, in the sense that they look for the worst and best case scenarios for the effects of the 
treatment (access to banking credit). Thus, if it can be established that access to banking credit 
has a positive effect in the worst-case scenario, then the data available will strongly indicate that 
it has a positive effect on firm performance. 
All the methods are based on non-parametric estimation of probability functions. Thus, 
they are free of functional form assumptions. 
 
8.2.1 Worst-Case  Bounds 
 
This procedure estimates the worst-case bounds. The outcome variable is assumed bounded, and 
normalized so that the lowest value is y=0 and the highest is y=1. Let y a vector with the 
performance data; z the vector of binary variables indicating whether firms have access to credit. 
Also, let x be data on covariates, observable characteristics of firms. 
This method computes for each treatment t∈{0,1}, the worst-case bounds on E[y(1)|x] 
and E[y(0)|x]: 
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Combining these equations, the resulting upper and lower bounds on the average 
treatment E[y(1)|x]-E[y(0)|x] are  
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While the average or point estimate effect on the treatment cannot be estimated from the 
data, both lower and upper bounds can be estimated. Here, if the observable characteristics x 
contain a continuous variable, the method uses kernel estimation of P(⋅|⋅) and E[⋅|⋅]. In case all x 
are discrete, they are computed using cell averages. 
 
  448.2.2  Estimates Assuming Exogenous Treatment Selection 
 
A different set of bounds can be estimated if additional identification assumptions are imposed. 
One set of assumptions commonly used (implicitly or explicitly) is to assume that the selection 
of firms according to z=1 or z=0 is an exogenous process. In the present application, this 
assumption takes the form of the condition that the selection of firms in terms of their access to 
credit amounts to: 
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This assumption, which is non-testable, is equivalent to assuming that the sample comes 
from a randomized experiment.  Under this assumption, the effect of having access to credit is 
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As before, if the observable characteristics x contain a continuous variable the method 
uses kernel estimation of P(⋅|⋅) and E[⋅|⋅]. In case all x are discrete, they are computed using cell 
averages. 
 
8.2.3  Instrumental Variable (IV) Bounds 
 
Sharper bounds could be obtained if further identification assumptions are made.  One 
possibility, which is widely used in other econometric exercises, is to assume that there is a set of 
(instrumental) variables that can be used to sharpen the estimation of the bounds.  For the 
exercises in terms of non-parametric bounds, the procedure here was developed in Manski 
(1995) and Manski and Horowitz (1995). 
Specifically, let v be instrumental variable (IV) data, and w the covariates not used as 
instruments. The IV bound on E[y(1)| w] is 
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  45The IV bound on E[y(0)|w] is defined analogously.  The lower (upper) bound on the 
treatment effect is the lower (upper) bound on E[y(1)|w] minus the upper (lower) bound on 
E[y(0)|w]. 
And, as before, if the observable characteristics x contain a continuous variable the 
method uses kernel estimation of P(⋅|⋅) and E[⋅|⋅]. In case all x are discrete, they are computed 
using cell averages. 
 
8.2.4  Results: Bounds on the Effects on Banking Credit 
 
In terms of firm behavior and performance, these methods will be applied to the 
performance/behavior measures used before: employment (Number of Employees), reinvestment 
rate, profit rate, and firm’s value. Total investment was not considered, because assessing the 
effect of total investment makes it necessary to control for firm’s size (assets or employment). 
The sample size, however, is not large enough to allow a reliable use of no parametric methods 
with the rich structure of covariation across independent variables. 
The method makes it possible to investigate the effect of access to banking credit on 
different classes of firms. A first dimension to explore is the age of firms. Thus, an attempt is 
made to capture the effect of credit constraints on firms in different stages of their life cycle. A 
second dimension involves distinguishing among firms with different types of organization and 
management.  
Unfortunately, the sample is not large enough to permit a reliable estimate of the joint 
distribution function of the firm age, type of management, and access to bank credit. The key 
problem is that the age of a firm is a continuous variable, and kernel estimators, to be reliable, 
need large numbers of firms for each different age.  To circumvent this problem it was decided 
instead to classify firms in deciles of age, then estimate the probabilities for each cell of firms 
represented in each of the deciles. This avoids uninteresting large sensitivities in the observations 
of the characteristics of one or two firms in ranges where few firms are observed in the sample. 
Using quintiles instead of deciles did not significantly change the results. 
Based on results obtained from Heckman’s two-step estimators, uselott is utilized as an 
instrument for estimating IV bounds. In general, this instrument sharpens the bounds just 
slightly. It is certainly not enough to yield point estimation and moreover, it cannot rule out zero 
  46or negative values as a possibility. Similar results were obtained using other variables as 
instruments.  
Figures 3-6 show the results. The first panel of each figure shows the different values for 
the upper and lower bound. Those panels show the results according to firm type (age, 
TYPOWN=0,1), and according to whether worst/best case bounds are estimated or whether 
uselott is used to sharpen the bounds. In the latter case, the figures are labeled with the suffix 
“iv.” The horizontal axis of the figures is the mean age of the deciles where the firms belong. 
The second panel of each figure shows the (point) estimate of the effect assuming that the sorting 
between firms with access and without access is exogenous. This estimate is shown for firms of 
all ten age groups and for the two types of management. 
 
  47Figure 3. Bounds and Average Effects of Having Access to Banking Credit on  
Firm’s Employment 
 

























Lower Bound Type 0
Upper Bound Type 0
Lower Bound Type 1
Upper Bound Type 1
 
 

























  48Figure 4. Bounds and Average Effects of Having Access to Banking Credit on  
Firm’s Employment 
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  49Figure 5. Bounds and Average Effects of Having Access to Banking Credit on  
Firm’s Value 
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  50Figure 6. Bounds and Average Effects of Having Access to Banking Credit on  
Firms Profits 
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  51With worst and best case bounds, there is always the possibility that the effect of having 
access to banks is zero, as the interval defined by the bounds include zero in general. This is in 
general a problem with this methodology.  When so little restrictions are imposed, most datasets 
fail to rule out the possibility that average performance under the two alternatives (here bank 
credit or no bank credit) may be the same.  However, one advantage of these methods is that they 
explicitly describe the entire set of possibilities allowed by the data for the effects. In this sense, 
it is interesting that the worst-case bound is closer to zero for younger firms than for older firms. 
Therefore, this method suggests, without clearly implying, that banking credit is more likely to 
benefit younger firms than older ones.  
Interestingly, using instruments such as uselott does not greatly sharpen the bounds, but it 
does suffice to move their range to exclude zero. Indeed, with the IV-bounds, zero is sometimes 
outside the admissible range for younger firms managed by their owner.  These facts help to 
support the view that banking credit is more likely to have positive effects on the 
performance/behavior of firms at younger ages. A very important point is that, in general, the 
bounds allow the possibility of very large effects of banking credit on the performance/behavior 
of firms.  While in the worst-case scenario it cannot be ruled out that the effect of having access 
to banking credit is negligible or even negative, the bounds indicate that the effects can 
potentially be huge. 
These methods do not provide a direct way to obtain a point estimate. One possibility is 
to take the average between the worst and the best-case bounds, or between the upper and lower 
bounds of the IV estimator. But, such a selection criterion does not have an explicit, conceptually 
sound, basis. If one is willing to accept exogenous selection as an identification assumption, one 
could directly compute a point estimate for the effect of banking credit. Those estimates are 
reported in the lower panels for each of the performance/behavior measures.  As can be seen, in 
general the point estimates are positive, and indeed, very large, for all age groups and 
management types.  They appear larger for older firms.  
However, one must be aware that, as measured firm age increases, the sample includes 
smaller fractions of firms with own-management and non-banking credit. This mere fact reduces 
the reliability of the estimated effects, not only for the point estimates with exogenous selection 
but also for worst/best-case bounds and IV-bounds. Moreover, the bounds seem more 
symmetrical for the last age-decile. Thus, the data is rather uninformative for that last age group.  
  52With this limitation of the dataset in mind, it is necessary to emphasize that the results are more 




This paper has examined the finances of firms in Costa Rica, investigated the variables that 
explain access to formal banking credit, and explored the effect of credit limitations on the 
behavior and performance of firms. Those objectives were served by directly collecting 
information on firms of different size in a variety of manufacture sectors in the Metropolitan 
Area in Costa Rica.  Given the lack of good data sources in Costa Rica, the first contribution of 
this study is precisely the data that are collected.  Applying a variety of econometric techniques 
to the data, however, has provided interesting results.  
First of all, access to banking credit is very far from widespread.  Indeed, consistent with 
older studies, Costa Rican firms still depend to a large extent on informal credit and trade credit 
to finance their operations.  Moreover, this dependence is only a matter of intensity, as many 
firms do not obtain banking credit at all. There is also strong evidence that smaller and younger 
firms have significantly less banking credit than older, larger firms.  The small importance of 
banking credit is most vividly observed for entering firms; the data show that a large share of 
those firms’ funds come from own savings, transfers from relative transfers and informal credit. 
Also explored were the factors that determine access to banking credit. The use of simple 
econometric methods demonstrated that the probability of having banking credit and the fraction 
of banking credit with respect to total debt are mostly affected by firm’s characteristics, not 
entrepreneur’s characteristics.  The main determinants seem to be the firm’s value, the firm’s 
size in terms of number of employees, the firm’s age, and whether it keeps formal accounting 
procedures.  A serious limitation of this part of the study is that those firms’ characteristics are 
the outcome of previous, current and future behavior and performance, which, in principle, are 
affected by the accessibility to credit itself, and the longitudinal data needed for identifying the 
direct effect of those factors are not available. Consequently, research centers in Costa Rica 
should recognize the importance of setting up a longitudinal survey on the production and 
financing decisions of small and large firms. 
It was originally expected that personal characteristics such as the education and age of 
the entrepreneur would be key factors behind access to credit. Surprisingly, though, the data 
  53generally do not single out characteristics of the entrepreneur that would explain access to credit 
for ongoing firms or new firms. Interestingly, previous experience as entrepreneur has a negative 
and significant effect on the participation of banks in the financing of new firms. This finding is 
compatible with several very different hypotheses, all of them highlighting the importance of 
credit constraints for new firms. A similar result, but without statistical significance, holds for 
entrepreneurs with other sources. Again, it would be very useful to have available longitudinal 
data in order to discern between these alternative hypotheses. 
Finally, adopting ideas from the econometric literature on treatment effects, results from 
two methods to correct for selection biases were reported: a parametric two-step point method 
and a non-parametric method that estimates upper and lower bounds for the effect of having 
access to bank credit. The two methods are very different, and both failed to render sharp or 
statistically conclusive results. But, both methods pointed in the direction that having access to 
banking credit can have large effects on the behavior of firms, increasing their size, investment, 
and profits. Once again, though, it appears that the results could have been much more 




  54Appendix: Additional Tables 
 
Table 13. Screening Actions: % Frequently to Always 
  Total  Demog. Type  Inst. Type 
Item sample  Met. Rural Pub. Priv.  Co-op Other
# of Intermediaries  (31) (13) (18) (15) (8)  (5) (3)
Visit the firm  64.5 84.6 50.0 60.0 75.0  60.0 66.6
Study the project evaluation  87.0 92.3 83.3 93.3 87.5  60.0 100.0
Study financial statements  93.5 100.0 88.8 93.3 100.0  66.6 100.0
Analyze risk of project  87.0 76.9 94.4 93.3 75.0  66.6 100.0
Analyze sectoral risk  61.2 61.5 61.1 60.0 62.5  60.0 66.6
Analyze international risk  19.3 30.7 11.1 13.3 37.5  20.0 0.0
Assess liquidity of collateral  93.5 92.3 94.4 93.3 100.0  66.6 100.0
Market value of collateral  96.7 100.0 94.4 100.0 100.0  66.6 100.0
Check reputation of applicant  90.3 100.0 83.3 93.3 100  60.0 100.0
Physically audit collateral  80.6 92.3 72.2 66.6 100.0  100.0 66.6




Table 14. Criteria for Granting Loans: % Important to Crucial 
  Total  Demog. Type  Inst. Type 
Item Sample Met. Rural Pub. Priv.  Co-op Other
# of Intermediaries  (31) (13) (18) (15) (8)  (5) (3)
Solvency of applicant  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0
Existence of project evaluation  90.3 84.6 94.4 100.0 75.0  66.6 100.0
Profitability of project  96.7 92.3 100.0 100.0 87.5  100.0 100.0
Credit references  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0
Existence of collateral  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0
Type of collateral  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0
Value of collateral  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0
Liquidity of collateral  96.7 92.3 100.0 100.0 87.5  100.0 100.0
Previous experience with borrower  96.7 100.0 94.4 100.0 87.5  100.0 100.0
Information from visit  96.7 92.3 100.0 100.0 87.5  100.0 100.0
Risk of project  93.5 84.6 100.0 93.3 87.5  100.0 100.0
Economic sector of project  87.0 84.6 88.8 100.0 87.5  60.0 66.6
 
 
The answers come from the credit manager of each intermediary and other credit and 
collection personnel. The sample contains answers from fifteen agencies of the three public 
banks, eight private banks, five savings and credit cooperatives and three “other” banks. The 
intermediaries were divided according to two classifications: Demographic types (Metropolitan 
or Rural) and Institutional types (Public, Private, Co-operative, and Other). These tables as well 
  55as many others are discussed in Monge, Cascante and Hall (2001).  Here, the importance of an 
item is summarized by grouping the answers in Frequently to Always, Important to Crucial and 
Yes. 
 
Table 15. Use of Credit Bureaus by Intermediaries 
Private\Public Yes  No  Total 
      
Yes  8 (4)  3 (3)  11 (7) 
No  10 (5)  10 (1)  20 (6) 












  56Table 16. The Functioning of Four Credit Bureaus 
 
  Managed by Coalitions  Independent Firms 
Item  SUGEF  ABC  Bureau A  Bureau B 
        
Operation of Bureau  2 years  1 year  41 years  5 years 
        
Number of clients  103 
intermediaries 
8 banks  Not revealed  1219 
        
Individuals in 
database 
424,342  Unknown 700,000 apx.  600,000 apx. 
        
Employees 4  2  60  15 
        
Process. of Info  Banks  Banks  Employees  Clients/Employ
ees 
        
Credit Histories  Good and Bad  Bad  Good and Bad  Bad 
        
Grading of debtors  Yes  No  Yes  No 
        
Other Information  No  Not yet  Yes  Yes 
        
Consultations per 
day 
200 appx.  Not 
revealed 
Not revealed  7,500 apx. 
       
Transfer of 
Information 
Messengers Modem  Phone-Modem  Modem-Fax 
        
Time per consult.  24 hrs.  Instant 
Old Info: 
Instant 
Updated: 24 hrs 
Instant 
        
Memory of Data  Infinite  10 years  Infinite  3000 days 
        
Other services  No  No  Yes  Yes 
        
Charges Free  Lump  per 
month 
Per consult  Per consult 
        
International 
Services 
No No  Yes  No 
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